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When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus
Building and Mediation As Public Interest Lawyering
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*

"The skillful management of conflicts [is] among the highest
of human skills."
-Stuart Hampshire l
I. INTRODUCTION: PROCESS IS JUSTICE

British social philosopher Stuart Hampshire recently articulated
the fundamental and foundational principles of the modem conflict
resolution movement (and I do call it a movement).2 He asserted that,
"there will always be a plurality of different and incompatible
conceptions of the good and there cannot be a single comprehensive
and consistent theory of human virtue.,,3 Correspondingly, "our
political enmities in the city or state will never come to an end while
we have diverse life stories and diverse imaginations.'''' Hampshire, a
socially progressive, socialist philosopher hoped to articulate

* Professor of Law and Director, Hewlett-Georgetown Program in Conflict Resolution
and Problem Solving, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article was prepared as part of
Washington University School of Law's 2001-2002 Public Interest Law Speaker Series. Thanks
to Karen Tokarz, my friend and host and to all of my good colleagues on the Washington
University law faculty. And, thanks and appreciation to my research assistant, Joshua Eizen, my
friend and literary guide, Marshall Sikowitz, and to the Harvard Program on Negotiation (PON)
faculty workshop (and especially Sara Cobb, PON's then Executive Director) where I first
presented some of my thoughts on how faIling balIoons and human motivation could not be
saved or cabined by purely rational or law-based "solutions."
1. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLIer 35 (2000).
2. ld. Hampshire first articulated these ideas at Harvard University's Tanner Lectures on
Human Values in two lectures during the 1996-1997 academic year. Hampshire expanded the
Lectures in Justice is Conflict. ld. at xiii. Harvard University, 1996-1997, published as Justice is
Conflict (2000).
3. ld. at 34.
4. ld. at 5.
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universal conceptions of the good.5 In his lifetime of reflection on
this important subject, Hampshire concluded that at best we know the
bad things-the evils we want to eliminate-when we see them, but we
cannot agree on either the means to eliminate those evils or the
content of the good we seek to promote. 6 One person's equitable redistribution of wealth is another's person confiscation of justly held
and earned property. In the evening of his productive years of
contemplation, Hampshire adopted a procedural or process-driven
social philosophy that I want to discuss today. Hampshire has named
and described the moral articulation of the approach I have been
arguing for, teaching and practicing with for much of my career in
seeking social justice through law. Today we will explore how
processes other than litigation can serve the public interest, at least as
well, if not better than, the more commonly used methods of lawsuits,
litigation and commanded rule-changes.
While Hampshire concludes that agreement on the substantive
good is not possible in our modern, diverse, and pluralistic world/ he
is optimistic that there might be one human universal: "fairness in
procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature ....
[T]here is everywhere a well-recognized need for procedures for
conflict resolution, which can replace brute force and domination and
tyranny."g Hampshire refers to several forms of conflict resolution,
including both well-known forms such as adjudication, arbitration,
and ''judging,,,9 as well as broader political processes such as
deliberating, examining, discussing policy choices, diplomatic
negotiations, and "hearing."IO
Seeking to defme a universal human propensity for procedural
fairness, Hampshire reduces conflict resolution to the single
principle, audi alteram partem ("hear the other side"), II a universal
principle of "the adversary argument" in which thinking is identified

5. Hampshire lists absence of violence, oppression, illness, and poverty, among other
things in his universal conceptions of the good. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 9-10.
11. Id. at 8.
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with the use of reason to weigh alternatives. 12 When properly
expanded from "hear the other side" to "hear all sides," Hampshire
provides a foundational principle from which to measure whether
justice and the public interest are served in all political and legal
decision making. Where Hampshire sees justice in the recognition
that all conflict is inevitable and must be humanely tended to, those
in the conflict resolution movement see the conflict resolution
processes employed as at least one important measure of justice.
Furthermore, despite what law professors teach in civil procedure or
constitutional law, "due" or 'Just" process does not necessarily
require litigation, a "day in court," or a lawsuit.
Today, using a variety of illustrations from real issues, real cases,
scholarship, literature, films, and other cultural artifacts, I want to
explore how processes that enable the expression and "handling" of
conflict may serve the public interest as well as, if not better than, the
simplistic Anglo-American conception of adversary justice or public
interest litigation.

II. PROBLEMS WITH "TWO-SIDED" ADVERSARIALISM
It is common in human thinking to divide the world into
dichotomous categories. In my view, there is truth in the old joke,
"There are two kinds of people in the world-those who divide
things into two-and those who don't." Hampshire thinks of human
conflicts as having two sides, perhaps because he is a product of
Anglo-philosophical thinking, the same system that produced the
adversary legal system. Hampshire is not alone in conceiving of
human dilemmas as the confrontation of good and evil, the just and
unjust, competition and cooperation, the rich and the poor, plaintiffs
and defendants, as if there were null sets in all those places in
between those categories. In a binary view of process, we need to
listen to, take in, and fully understand the "other side" and then either
we will be persuaded through negotiation or a third party will decide
by adjudication how those opposite views should be reconciled,
accommodated, or judged.
12. [d. at 8-9.
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I am one of those people who does not divide the world into two
categories,13 so I want to expand on Hampshire's significant
observations about the importance of conflict resolution as a process
to demonstrate that his principle of "hearing all sides" supplies the
philosophical justification for a variety of new forms of legal and
political dispute resolution, even about hotly contested, "adversarial"
issues affecting the public interest.
Few modern legal problems have only two sides. Civil rights
issues implicate employees, employers, customers, private entities,
many layers of governmental enforcement agencies, and grievance
processes. Environmental issues involve developers, local
communities, who themselves may be split between pro-development
employment seekers and environmental conservationists, a wide
variety of disagreeing public interest groupsl4 and federal, state, and
local agencies. Mass torts involve literally hundreds and thousands of
parties, not only the plaintiffs injured by mass accidents, products
defects, or slow environmental harms, but also multiple layers of
manufacturers, distributors, and insurers. Consider how often in
litigation the "real parties in interest" include others besides those
formally named as plaintiff or defendant in any given case. IS To the
extent that mUltiple parties have claims, needs, interests and "rights"
in a legal action, the concept of "hearing both sides" may be falsely
reductionist in assuming that all parties can align themselves on one
or the other side of the "v." and that any resolution favoring one side
over the other will solve the problem, conclude the litigation, or end
the conflict. Consider how many years the legal issues in Brown v.
Board ofEducation, 16 have been relitigated, not to mention the larger

13. See. e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a PostModem. Multi-cultural World, 38 WM. & MARy L. REv. 5 (1996).
14. Consider the different goals of various public interest environmental groups, such as,
the Sierra Club, the Humane Society, the Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society, and the
World Wildlife Federation. Some of the groups agree to land trades for development, others
resist all development, and still others "take sides" when one type of animal preservation
threatens another.
15. For examples of ways to read a case from a broader conflict resolution perspective,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J. LEG. ED. 14
(1999).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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social dilemmas that continue to plague education in our nation. 17
These dilemmas include economics, quality, privatization, and "white
flight."
Inspired by both practical achievement 18 and modem political
theory,19 new forms of legal processes have developed out of the
failures of conventional litigation and are now used in both private
settings and public settings such as courts, administrative regulatory
processes, and even in legislative contexts. Utilizing the Hampshirean
and Habermasian20 principles of "hearing the other side,,21 and
engaging in "democratic discourse,,,22 lawyers are increasingly
involved in negotiation, mediation, and consensus building situations
that depend on conflict resolution processes that are different from
argumentation, competitive advocacy, and law or rule-based decision
making. These different forms of conflict resolution employ different
techniques, require different skills, and are based on different
"moralities" or internally justified structures and outcomes.
In law, Lon Fuller is the legal philosopher who has most
eloquently written about the differentiation of legal processes for
different purposes.23 Indeed, as part of the "legal process" school of
jurisprudence, Fuller wrote a series of articles suggesting that
adjudication, mediation, and arbitration each had their own
structures, procedures, and independent "moralities.,,24 Fuller

17. Privatization and "white flight," as well as economic and quality issues continue to
plague education.
18. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK pt. 3 (Lawrence Susskind et aI. eds.,
1999) (review the case studies reported).
19. See, e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND (2000);
DELmERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELmERATION (1996); MARK.
KlNGWELL, A CIVIL TONGUE (1995); DELIBERATIVE POLmCS (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999);
AMY GUTIMANN & DENIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996);
DELmERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); MICHAEL C. DORF & CHARLES F. SABEL, A
Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COL. L. REv. 267 (1998).
20. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRmUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
21. HAMPSHIRE, supra note I, at 8.
22. See sources cited supra note 19.
23. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers ofInvention: The Intellectual Founders
ofADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 1 (2000).
24. See LON L. FuLLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth I. Winston, ed.
1981); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 liARv. L. REv. 353 (1978);
Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Form and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1971); Lon L. Fuller,
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believed that each process was uniquely suited to resolving or dealing
with particular kinds of legal problems and that different processes
should be used for fact, law, norm, or relationship issues. For Fuller,
as for me, one "size" of dispute resolution process-adjudicationdoes not fit all. Indeed, modem theorists and practitioners of dispute
resolution have increasingly permitted, and even encouraged, some
hybridization of these various processes to permit a greater variety of
"hearing and listening,,,25 as well as decisional processes depending
on such factors as the kinds of issues implicated and the number of
parties involved. 26

III. THE STRUCTURE OF PROCESS PLURALISM:

DIFFERENT MODES

FOR DIFFERENT CLAIMS

Conflict resolution processes as tools for achieving social justice
have several separate elements. First, different processes by
defmition develop their own process norms, justified by different
conceptions of what that process is supposed to do. Adjudication,
with which those in the public interest law movement are most
familiar, involves adversary advocacy of competing parties and
principles, often beginning with a contested trial and then proceeding
to appellate resolution and decision.27 In contrast, mediation and
negotiation use less formal means of party engagement, where it is
contemplated that unfettered dialogue, followed by consent and
agreement will produce an outcome that both, or all, parties have
participated in crafting.
Second, different processes produce different kinds of outcomes.
Proponents, like myself, of problem-solving through negotiation,
mediation, or the newer forms of consensus building, believe that the
outcomes produced by such participatory processes are qualitatively

Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 15 NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. PROC. 8 (1962); Lon L.
Fuller, An Aflenvord: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1604 (1966).
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. See. e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994).
27. Trials are often contested when there are competing views of the "facts." Litigation
often advances to the appellate level when one of the parties seeks a definitive legal rule
change. Consider the prototypical public interest law campaigns for Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

HeinOnline -- 10 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 42 2002

2002]

When Litigation is Not the Only Way

43

better than those produced by third party decision-makers. Consensus
outcomes are more likely to focus on the future, as well as the past.
They are supposed to be based on underlying interests and needs,
rather than arguments and positions. As the popular parlance goes,
they are intended to "expand the pie," or look for additional resources
or new ideas, rather than to divide a presumed limited sum of
resources available to the parties. In more technical terms, different
processes are more likely to produce "pareto optimal" solutions28
than the assumed compromises of negotiation or "split the baby"
compromise verdicts or arbitration awards. In processes where all the
"real parties in interest,,29 participate, there will be more than two
sides to each issue and very likely there will be more than one issue
to be resolved. Expanding, rather than narrowing, issues will increase
the likelihood of reaching good agreements, because as game theory
and other quantitative theories propose, more solutions are possible
when more "trades" are possible.30 Although it may seem counterintuitive to conventional legal reasoners, the more disagreement
about what is important, the better. Oppositional or complementary
"trades" allow each side to satisfy their most important needs by
meeting the most important needs of other parties. With more
complementary, rather than conflicting, desires, we can find more
ways to share things, an elaboration of the Homans theory of
complementary needs. 31
For all of the above reasons, the current theoretical and practical
technology of ADR approaches to legal problems would be better
described as "appropriate" dispute resolution, rather than
"alternative" dispute resolution, as we refer to it now. Matching
different techniques with different goals can help to assess what
process is most appropriate for accomplishing the outcome that is
best suited to the particular kind ofproblem.32

28. "Paretu optimal" solutions are those that make each party as well off as it can be
without unnecessary haIID to the other parties. See HOWARD RAlFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 139 (1982).
29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., HOWARD RAlFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
31. See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS
(Robert K. Merton ed., 1974).
32. As examples, consider, joint custody, rather than exclusive physical custody in
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In addition to the selection of different procedural rules33 and
different rules of decision34 entirely different and morally
differentiated modes of appeal, argument, and justification may be
utilized to deal with different kinds of conflicts. Lawyers and rational
analysts clearly prefer arguments, principles, rights, and rules.
Economists, political scientists, some lawyers, and realists recognize
that preference trading or bargaining is the actual way in which
political and legal decisions are made and utilities are maximized.
More recently, a newer group of theorists, drawn from a wide variety
of disciplines35 have argued that emotions, feelings, passions, and
belief systems are an integral part of the way people process
information, argue for justice, and decide whether to agree to
something or resolve a conflict.36 Most scholars focus on the tensions
between the first two of these "modes"-the tension between rational
principle and "crude bargaining.,,37 More recently, focus in conflict
resolution has turned to the role of feelings, beliefs, the need for
cathartic narrative, and human "imagination" or "soul,,38 to determine
whether conflicts are deemed, by the parties, to be "resolved."
Thus, conflict over legal, moral, social, and political principles
and "goods,,39 can be handled and "manipulated" in a number of
different ways. The "essentialist" public interest lawyer tends to think

parenting. See I Am Sam (New Line Productions, 2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, I Am Sam as
an ADR Movie, Picturing Justice, at http://www.picturingjustice.comliamsam_meadow.htm
(last visited Apr. 23, 2002). Also consider environmental trades of land for animal and habitat
preservation and waste siting, contingent agreements for science disputes and medical
monitoring for some product defects cases and mass torts and even simple annuities for
traditional tort cases.
33. Compare HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER (Darwin Patnode ed.,
1989), and the FED. R. CN. P. with THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at
pt. 1.
34. Different rules of decision include one or more judges, majority, plurality, or "super
majority" vote, and unanimous consent.
35. Proponents span the range from philosophy and political science, to sociology,
anthropology, critical legal approaches based on race and gender and post-modernism.
36. JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS (1989); JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND
(1999).
37. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
REsOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et. al. eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Agreement without Theory,
in DELIBERATIVE POLmCS, supra note 19.
38. These are Hampshire's phrases. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1.
39. "Goods" is used here in both the material and ideal senses of the word.
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of litigation and adjudication as the normative ways of accomplishing
public good, perhaps because the model set by Brown v. Board of
Education appeared so successful.40 At least some sophisticated
lawyers, who care about public interest and seek social justice,
recognize that litigation, although it has its uses, may not be optimal
for all forms of legal change. Many public interest groups use, and
have recently intensified their use of, legislative and lobbying efforts.
Many groups in the civil rights, civil liberties and environmental
movements use, or had to defend against, the referendum process. In
the administrative context, some public interest groups participate in
negotiated rule~making,41 one of the hybrid forms of dispute
resolution I want to highlight here. Poverty lawyers and community
development activists always explore other models of social and legal
change, from organizing, to street or court theater, to community
education, to collaborative joint venture strategies.42 More recently,
even the most avid of traditional poverty law advocates recognize the
importance of "facilitating coalitions" and encouraging "collaborative
relationships across professions.,,43

40. Of course, in recent years many question and debate the "success" of that landmark
piece of litigation and strategy. The debate occurs not only among legal scholars, see Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959), but
among political scientists and economists who are attempting to assess the actual empirical
impact of legal efforts to desegregate the schools, see, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); JAMES HECKMAN &
PETRA TODD, SOURCES OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE LABOR MARKET
IN THE 20m CENTURY.
41. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997).
42. See, e.g., SAUL ALINSKY, REvEILLE FOR RADICALS (1969); Stephen Wexler,
Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049 (1970); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris,
Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice ofLaw, 11 NYU
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the
Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINlCAL L. REv. 157 (1994);
Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 67 (2000); Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of
Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINlCAL L. REv. 433 (1998); Symposium, Lawyering for Poor
Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 673 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, RE1NVIGORATING POVERIT LAW PRAcrICE, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801 (1998); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, The Workplace Project and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 407 (1995).
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IV. MUST WE COMPETE TO "WIN" SOCIAL JUSTICE OR CAN WE
"COOPERATE"?

The underlying tension of how best to achieve legal and social
change on behalf of "the public interest,,44 replicates basic
philosophical, epistemological, political, and behavioral issues about
whether it is humans' lot to have to compete over social goods4S or
whether collaboration, community, cooperation, and shared fates
motivates people to work together to achieve a better world. Let me
illustrate how this basic human dilemma runs through all human
activity, from the basic instinct for survival to more complex efforts
to use law to effectuate social change.
In a brilliant novel, entitled Enduring Love, Ian McEwen
eloquently demonstrates this tension. In the opening sequence of the
novel, the protagonist, a science writer, is about to share a much
wanted picnic with his wife, only to discover that a large air balloon
carrying a child and an older man are hovering above in the sky, in
obvious distress. Not knowing what propels him except a child's cry,
Joe rushes to grab a dangling rope and steady the balloon, joined by
four other men, from different points around a field, "racing into this
story and its labyrinths.'046 All five men have different ideas about
how to save the boy and his adult companion, as the wind gusts build
and the dangling rope, man and child are pushed above a steep
escarpment. Four of the men eventually let go and the balloon, the
man and boy, and one man still dangling from the rope, sail over the
cliff. The protagonist suggests that some calculations of the speed of
wind gusts, weights of the five men, distance and height might have
saved the boy and man had anyone been able to do the calculations in
enough time, the failure of "rational" thinking in emergencies. In the
aftermath of what turns into a catastrophe, the loss of life, Joe Rose
44. I am avoiding definitions here. For my efforts to define what constitutes a social
justice lawyer engaged in "cause lawyering", see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause
Lawyering: Toward An Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice
Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMlTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
45. Competition recharacterized by the "zero-sumn/scarcity view of human nature,
requiring litigation, and command and control for social justice and Ie-distribution.
46. IAN McEWAN, ENDURING LOVE 1 (1997).
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sees the problem as akin to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each of the five
men had to decide whether to hold on to the rope and steady the
balloon as a strong gust takes it up over the falling escarpment. In
that split second moment, all the teachings of human nature as
competitive and self"preserving or cooperative and group protective
are brought to bear in the situation. As with the classic Prisoner's
Dilemma, the parties cannot communicate with each other because
the wind is so strong they cannot hear each other shouting
contradictory advice and intentions. Joe recounts, from his memory
of the event, the simultaneous desire to "stay on the rope and save the
boy, [when] barely a neuronal pulse later, came other thoughts, in
which fear and instant calculations of logarithmic complexity were
fused.'.47 None of the five men admits to being the first to let go,
though all but one of the men do let go, as the balloon sails off the
cliff. Joe attributes their failure to coordinate their actions and do the
greatest good-the saving of all, to the lack of a leader, team, and
plan, rather than just themselves. In that instant he recognizes that
"cooperation -the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force
behind our evolving capacities for language, the glue of our social
cohesion" failed them because:
letting go was in our nature too. Selfishness is also written on
our hearts. This is our mammalian conflict; what to give to
others and what to keep for yourself. Treading that line,
keeping the others in check and being kept in check by them, is
what we call morality ... our crew enacted morality's ancient,
irresolvable dilemma: us, or me.48
As each man accedes to the salience of "me," the ''us'' is lost and
death ensues. For Joe Rose, a "society" that began as a good society
becomes a bad society as it disintegrates as each man looks out for
himself alone and one dies, dangling from the rope, as his single
weight is insufficient to bring the balloon to safe ground.
In that literarily realized moment, McEwen describes the plight of
us all as humans and certainly of the public interest-seeking lawyerhow should I act to save or better human life? Do I hold on to my
47. ld. at 14.
48. ld. at 14-17.
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self-interest and self-preservation and compete with others, or stay
and attempt to coordinate action with others to achieve the greatest
good for the greatest number? This dilemma of cooperate or defect is
played out daily in both the macro and micro decisions of our lives.
McEwen's story dramatizes the need for human coordination of
action, the failure of rational calculations and incomplete
information, and the conflicting impulses and emotions of those who
would seek to do good.
The recent movie, A Beautiful Mind,49 is a clever Hollywood
depiction of the more complicated ideas of John Nash's bargaining
theories, within the context of non-cooperative and cooperative
"games"SO within game theory. In game theory, to cooperate is to be
able to share information, non-cooperative games are those in which,
like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the parties cannot communicate
preferences, interests, threats, or other forms of information.sl In the
movie, John Nash's more complicated explanations of equilibrium
points in multi-party non-cooperative games is demonstrated as a
problem of maximizing joint gain when all the men in a bar compete
for the single beautiful blond. With all attempting to maximize
individual gain with a scarce resource, a single blond, there will be
one victor and a lot of lonely men and female brunettes. Nash sees, in
a moment of creative insight,S2 that all the men would be better off if
they paired up with their "second choices" and all got dates. This
demonstrates, Hollywood style, that an equilibrium point of
49. A BEAUTIFUL MIND (Universal Pictures 2001).
50. See, e.g., John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); John
Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 129 (1953).
51. For technical descriptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma, see, e.g., WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
TIIE LAW (1994); AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THiNKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLmcs AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991). For less technical
depictions, just watch NYPD Blue (NBC television broadcast) on television every week where
Prisoner's Dilemma is literally shown as two compatriots in crime are locked up in different
cells and forced or cajoled into "defecting" against each other, with promises of "better deals"
for cooperating with the police.
52. The real story of mathematical genius is a bit more complex, as proofs have to be
elaborated to the satisfaction of peers. See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYl, CREATIVITY:
FLOw AND TIIE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); SYLVIA NASAR, A
BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN FORBES NASH, JR., WINNER OF TIIE NOBEL PRIZE IN
EcONOMICS, 1994 (1998).
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maximizing joint gain can be established for multi-party games or
dilemmas, just as a "minimax" strategy, developed by original game
theorists Von Neumann and Morgenstern,53 can establish a point of
strategic agreement based on a combination of mistrust and selfinterest in zero-sum games.54 Game theory elucidates that
combination of rational strategic thinking, the ability to share
information, the formation of preferences, interests and utilities and
most importantly, the "rules" or assumptions that determine whether
outcomes will be "rational" or "maximizing," either for particular
individual players or for all of them "in the game."
This narrative which spawned decades of mathematical, political
science,55 and psychological research into human motivation and
decision-making comes from our own domain of law enforcement
(the "prisoner's dilemma"). The truth, however, is that its application
to real legal disputes is actually much more complex. Information
rules and the number of parties, as well as initial resource
endowments,56 make the assumptions of game theory evocative for
us, but not fmally determinative or fully satisfying. Therefore, game
theory asks the somewhat dichotomous question of whether to
cooperate or defect, whether to hold on to the rope to save the other
or let go and save our self. Unfortunately, legal, social, and political
disputes are not so simple and often pose more multi-faceted
questions. If the parties always defect, or hide information, they will
not know about the possibilities of mutually agreeable solutions to
their problems. If they seek to ''win'' a dramatic court suit, they may
leave the other side with a strong desire for revenge that will inhibit
compliance with even the most defmitive court ruling. Further, if the
conditions change, a ruling based on the past set of events or
conditions may quickly be avoided or rendered moot.57
53. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1944).
54. POUNDSTONE, supra note 51, at 97.
55. ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
56. Classic game theory assumes "players" of equal bargaining power, see Nash, supra
note 50.
57. Consider how a school district-based set of geographical rulings in the remedial
sequella of Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), made broader remedial options across
districts much harder to justify, as more and more whites fled to the suburbs or private schools
following Brown. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Detroit school desegregation
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Therefore, the question of whether to compete or cooperate is too
complicated and important to leave to the dry assumptions of game
theory, especially when people's lives and social justice hang in the
balance. For this reason, I suggest that conventional lawsuits and
important, but limited, "competitive" and polarized public interest
campaigns are not the best ways to achieve social justice in the
current multi-partied and multi-issue world, especially with the
unequal resource allocations of the parties. Social justice is not a
"game." If the goal is to maximize joint gain, or at least improve the
social conditions for those worst off, then we will need all the tools
and all the strategies that are likely to help. As McEwen's balloon is
buffeted by sudden winds beyond the parties' control, team work,
coordination, communication, and cooperation may be necessary to
bring the people back to ground for a safe landing. Public interest
lawyers, indeed, all lawyers, need to learn and then use a wider
variety of techniques and processes to achieve their aims of social
justice.
V. LEGAL PRACTICE, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
SOME EXAMPLES

Though many do think of American legal and governmental
processes in binary terms-fact and law, plaintiffs and defendants,
Republicans and Democrats, federalism and states' rights, developers
and conservationists, conservatives and liberals-the truth is far more
complex as modern legal and governmental developments have well
illustrated. Even our two party system is contingent historically and
might have turned out differently if Thomas Jefferson had acceded to
the request of John Adamss8 that they create a coalition government
when the outcome of the 1796 election seemed in doubt and too close
to call.s9 Adams hoped that the parties could put aside their

case).
58. Perhaps the compromise was suggested by Abigail Adams. Ifwomen were among the
founding "mothers" would our governmental structure have looked different? MARy BETH
NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); LYNNE WITHEY, DEAREST FRIEND: A LIFE OF ABIGAIL ADAMS
(1981).
59. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 179-

HeinOnline -- 10 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 50 2002

2002]

When Litigation is Not the Only Way

51

antagonism for the good of the new Republic, despite differences
over foreign policy and the national debt, among other issues,
including slavery. Jefferson, however, retreated to Monticello and our
two party system arose in lurid60 and contested adversarialism.
As modem inheritors of Adams' desire to do what was best for the
polity as a whole, but perhaps ironically using Jeffersonian-inspired
principles of regionalism and local control, a number of
"experiments" in governance and political decision-making focus on
transcending binary oppositions as ways of achieving resolutions to
legal and political conflicts.61
At the level of political theory these experiments draw their life
and justification from participatory democracy and democratic
discourse. 62 At the level of process, many of these processes draw
their practice from mediation theory and practice. 63 Mediation
theories strive to reach a consensual agreement that maximizes joint,
not individual gain, and depends, in part, on the facilitation of a third
party neutral to manage information sharing, rules of process, and
rules of decision and creative brainstorming processes to enrich the
range of possibilities for resolution.
Mediation and its cousin, consensus building for multi-party,
multi-issue public policy decision-making, are undertaken for several
different reasons including: functional problem-solving64; law

88 (2000) [hereinafter ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTIlERS] (suggesting that Adams sought to develop
a bi-partisan government with Jefferson, which was opposed by James Madison, Jefferson's
political and partisan strategist). See also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, PASSIONATE SAGE: THE LEGACY OF
JOHN ADAMS 29-32 (1993).
60. Both sides (Federalists and Republicans) engaged in personal slander as weII as
political diatribes, the famous James Callendar writing scurrilous stories "bout anyone when
paid by the other side. See ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTIlERS, supra note 59.
61. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at pt. 3.
62. See supra note 15; LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & LIORA ZION, STRENGTIIENlNG TIlE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN TIlE UNITED STATES (2001) (manuscript on file with the author).
63. See, e.g., CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION: THEORY POLICY AND PRACTICE
(2001) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION]; Howard Raiffa, Post-Setllement
Setllements, 1 NEG. J. 9 (1985); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure ofProblem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
64. This includes resolving a dispute, environmental siting, clean-up allocations, block
grant allocation and internal organizational dispute resolution. See, e.g., Lauren Edelman et aI.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAw &
SOC'y REv. 497 (1993); The Many, Different, and Complex Roles Played by Omsbudsmen in
Dispute Resolution, 16 NEG. J. 35 (Howard Gadlin ed., 2000).
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making65 ; litigation settlement66; legal decision-making in new legal
institutions67 ; policy development68 ; strategic planning and
organizational change69 ; multi-jurisdictional disputes, treaties and
law-making opportunities7o ; dialogues 71 ; and healing, transformative,
and expressive encounters.72
The use of mediation or consensus building processes involve

65. This includes negotiated rule-making, local rules, development of state-wide
commissions, international treaties and negotiated orders, such as the Kyoto Global Wanning
treaty, etc.). See, e.g., Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO.
L1. 1 (1982).
66. Mediation is used to settle mass torts and class action lawsuits.
67. Problem-solving courts, such as family, drug courts, "vice," and domestic violence
courts often utilize mediation. See, e.g., Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times, 48
HAsTINGS L.J. 851 (1997); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000); Greg Berman & John
Feinblatt, Problem Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL'y 125 (2001); Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 3
(1999).
68. This includes multi-agency policy setting such as in transportation, urban sprawl, and
sustainable growth.
69. Mediation is used in government agencies priority setting, corporate strategic
planning, university mission statements, and budget planning. Even the American Association
of Law Schools now sponsors facilitated planning retreats for law schools. Former Dean of
Washington University School of Law, Dorsey "Dan" Ellis, and I are members of1he AALS
Resource Corps, trained to facilitate consensus-building law school planning retreats. Indeed, I
facilitated such a retreat at Washington University several years ago with Curtis Berger, former
professor at Columbia University Law School (now deceased).
70. International environmental treaties, state, local, and regional coordinating efforts on
such issues as crime, growth, and AIDS policy utilize mediation. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND,
NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES (2001); Michael Hughes et aI.,
Facilitating Statewide HIVIAIDS Policies in Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK, supra note 18.
7l. Non-decisional opportunities to debate, discuss, and inform communities that have
widely different views about important political or moral issues such as abortion, see, e.g.,
Michelle LeBaron & Nike Cartarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 18; Margaret Herzig, Public Conversations, 4
DISP. REsOL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 10; affirmative action, see discussion of facilitated
dialogues on California's Proposition 209 (anti-affirmative action referendum) in MenkelMeadow, supra note 13, at 34-35, animal rights, see, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & J.
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987), without any expectation of decision, but in
hopes of furthering human understanding also use mediation.
72. Mediation has been used in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
Human Values Project in Macedonia, and even bookstore/coffee house readings and
discussions of controversial matters). See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS (1998); SUSAN COLLIN MARKS, WATCHING THE WIND: CONFLICT REsOLUTION
DURING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2000).
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procedures that differ from conventional litigation.73 First, all the
stakeholders or interested parties are identified and invited to the
process, either in direct participation or by constituent representation.
Second, the parties identify a broad agenda, rather than a limited set
of triable issues. Third, in complex cases, a professional team of
convenors studies the conflict or dispute or policy agenda and creates
a conflict assessment or map of the proceeding to be commented on
in advance by all the parties. Fourth, the parties select neutral
facilitators to guide both process and rules of decision. During the
process, the parties engage in joint fact-finding while the facilitators
and parties develop groundrules for structured, but open, discourse. 74
Further, parties engage in creative brainstorming, rather than
argumentative debate or structured witness examination. Neutral
process experts facilitate collaboration, and often task-specified team
assignments work simultaneously and decisions are "taken" by partyagreed standards of consensus in policy settings or consent in
mediated agreements. The outcomes, reached by facilitated
negotiation and consent, rather than externally imposed decisions, are
widely thought to lead to greater satisfaction, legitimacy,
implementability, and voluntary compliance.
Conventional public interest advocacy often assumes that there
are good guys and bad guys. For justice to prevail, a third party, the
courts, must hear the facts and rule the bad guys out of order
establishing good legal precedent in the process.75 Problems arise
when there are many actors and good guys and bad guys meld
together, when there are not enough resources to share between the
bad guys and the good guys, or when the processes76 are simply
73. See generally MENKEL-MEADOW, MEDIATION, supra note 63.

74. Ground rules are particularized for each situation from a common core of principles.
In mediation, confidentiality is likely to be one of the key ground rules. Confidentiality is
complex, as evidenced by the many layers of rules and laws pertaining to mediation
confidentiality. See, e.g., Symposium, Uniform Mediation Act, 85 MARQUETTE L. REv. 1
(2001). 1'1 consensus building, openness or transparency is more likely to be the ground rule,
especially in jurisdictions with Open Meeting or Sunshine laws. See ROGERS ET AL.,
MEDIATION, LAW, PRACl1CE AND POLICY (2001).
75. Legislative advocacy seeks to create statutory law by using testimony, also usually
quite adversarial or agonistic, to regulate the bad guys and protect the good guys. See DEBORAH
TANNEN, nIB ARGUMENT CULTURE (1998).
76. Traditional processes include courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.
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gridlocked with competing sides or overworked with too-big-tohandle-dockets. When the losers in the electoral process or the
defeated in the litigation process, seek to upset their losses with
constant battles, new elections, appeals, and attempts to dethrone or
reverse "settled" outcomes, the paradigm again fails. Occasionally,
the interested parties are so turned off by the complexities, expense,
and wastefulness of these traditional processes they simply refuse to
participate. Because of these concerns, and others, creative lawyers,77
attempting to find social justice for the many, rather than for the few,
use the structured processes of mediation and consensus building to
arrive at negotiated solutions to very complex legal and social
problems.
The environmental arena is an especially productive domain for
these processes. Former Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt,
frustrated by the legislative grid-lock on some forms of
environmental regulation and wildlife protection, championed a
process he denominated "quasi-legislative dispute resolution.,,78
Habitat Conservation Planning empowers the stakeholders in a
particular region to engage in trades and negotiations and to set
standards for preservation of species not protected by the binary
approach of current legislation.79 Environmental problems over
77. Lawyers are joined by other professionals, including mediators, urban planners,
diplomats, social workers, and psychologists in utilizing mediation.
78. Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resource Decisions Are
Made, in INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND
ADR 14 (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution ed., 2001).
79. As an example, he recounted his experience on Cape Cod when the proliferation of
seagulls, due to increased human presence, threatened several endangered bird species. The
Interior Departments' solution of lacing croutons with cyanide to kill the gulls brought more
parties and issues to the dispute. The croutons made the gulls sick, but not sick enough-they
didn't die right away but circled into the streets of Cape towns like Chatham. The animal rights
groups decried the killing of the gulls calling it "speciesim," but the biologists were concerned
about preserving some bird groups that faced extinction.
A consensus building-forum was quickly organized and a solution reached. "Hazers" were
stationed to flash and wave flags at the gulls, with an occasional rocket being set off, to scare
them away, rather than kill them. Even with this creative solution, eventually "deus ex
machina" and time helped. A sudden increase in coyotes on the island (another product of
increased human habitation) also scared the gulls and unfortunately ate the youngest gulls. But,
the animal rights people couldn't blame people, it was the "delicate balance of nature" and the
"natural" laws of the animals that eventually solved the problem.
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natural resource use80 cannot be solved in dichotomous terms and not
with the time-consuming processes of litigation or legislation. ''New
governmental processes,,81 involve all the stakeholders and to manage
a variety of targeted, and in some cases, unique, creative solutions to
problems. Such solutions may themselves be contingent aru:l revisited with an agreed-upon process as scientific conditions or facts
change.
The state of Oregon convened such a process to manage its
highway access dispute. 82 The dispute involved commuters and
developers who wanted more roads and residents and business people
who wanted fewer, larger roads, which threaten more intimate
communities and businesses running though existing towns and
villages. The Policy Consensus Institute helped facilitate a process.
All identified stakeholders participated, and a long-term plan was
first recommended to, and then adopted by, the appropriate
governmental decision-makers. The Governor of Oregon is so
committed to the process that he sits on the Board of the Policy
Consensus Institute. 83
The EPA, OSHA, and a variety of federal agencies are using a
similar process. The agencies use negotiated rule-making84 to involve
all stakeholders in rule drafting before the fact. Early involvement
avoids conflicts after the notice and comment period.85 While the
evaluative jury is still out on the success and efficiency of these
proceedings,86 "reg-neg" is being used by federal, state, and local

80. These include water, forests, air, deserts, and competing animal groups and land itself.

81. Babbitt, supra note 78, at 13-15.
82. Videotape: Building Consensus: Transportation Rulemaking in Oregon (policy
Consensus Initiative 2000) (on file with author).
83. PCI Board of Directors Names New Chair, POLlCY CONSENSUS INiTIATIVE
NEWSLETrER, Feb. 2002, at 7.
84. This is referred to as "reg-neg."
85. Without "reg-neg" post notice and comment conflicts typically end in court with an
often decade-long appeals processes.
86. Compare Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory
Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS 93 (Eric arts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001), and
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy ofNegotiated Rule-Making, 9 N.Y.U. ENV. LJ. 386
(2001), with Philip Harter, Assessing the Assessors, 9 N.Y.U. ENV. LJ. 32 (2000), and JODY
FREEMAN & LAURA LANGBEIN, REGULATORY NEGOTIATION AND TIIE LEGlTlMACY BENEFIT
(2002). See also Laura Langbein & Cornelius Kerwin, Negotiation versus Conventional
Rulemaking, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 599 (2000).
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governments.87
Beyond formal governmental uses, consensus building techniques
facilitate hotly contested value disputes. I facilitated "public
conversations" on affirmative action in California when Proposition
209 was pending. The aim was to educate voters that the issue was
far more complex than the polarized election debate suggested.
Different parties argued for different levels of affirmative action in
education, employment, and government contracting. The main goal
of the public conversations was to inform the public by exposing
multiple views from different sources, rather than the stylized debate
presented by the media88 and election materials. Public conversations,
facilitated by neutral professionals, have also been effective in the
bitterly contested realm of pro-choice and pro-life communities. The
conversations work to enhance understanding across seemingly
unbridgeable divides, as well as to encourage agreement on some
life-preserving solutions. 89
At the level of formal litigation, mediative settlement processes
and consensus building fora facilitate resolutions to a variety of mass
torts 90 and class actions. 91 This includes both the process dimensions
of "streams" of cases using ADR methods 92 (like mediation and
arbitration to decide individual claims93) and more creative outcomes
than courts normally would be permitted.94 Increasingly, federal 95 and

87. Mayor Anthony Williams, for example, has initiated a series of community fora,
facilitated by consensus building neutrals, on a number of specific issues in Washington D.C.
See DC Agenda, available at http://www.dcagenda.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2002) (an
organization-non-profit-created to sponsor and coordinate such multi-party collaborations in
Washington D.C.).
88. Even the so-called "enlightened" PBS Newshour continues to use pro/con formats for
most important issues.
89. Opponents may agree to diminish abortion clinic violence and pro-adoption material
distribution at clinics. See supra note 70.
90. In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 934 (E.D. Mich. Sept 12, 1995); In re Joint
Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 122 B.R. 6 (E.D. N.Y. Dec. 7, 1990).
91. In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001).
92. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
93. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).
94. Coupons, in-kind items, and other "non-monetary" outcomes are not without their
own controversies. Some believe class members receive very little relief, especially compared
to the large attorney fees awards that go to the plaintiffs' lawyers in these cases. See, e.g., Susan
Koniak, Under Cloak ofSettlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1996).
95. ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR
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state courts are requiring parties to participate in various forms of
ADR as part of the formal litigation process. All of the federal circuit
courts of appeal have mediation programs.96 Some judges use
mediation in early stages of litigation or in very long and contested
cases with complex remedial issues. 97 At the federal level, recent
Attorney General Janet Reno became a champion of ADR and other
forms of "legal problem solving." She established the Inter-agency
Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group to coordinate the use
of ADR in many federal agencies on issues such as contract
procurement and disputes, employment, administrative costs,
environmental clean-up, and inter-agency jurisdictional disputes. 98
Mediation also reverts to its source: the "simple" two party
dispute about almost anything. In the public interest environment, a
very few argue that creative and "gentler" forms of dispute resolution
can actually provide greater access to more individualized justice in a
variety of case types that greatly affect the disempowered. 99 Clearly,
there are issues of equality, access, and economic support for
participation in these different forms of justice. 100 To the extent that
creative and participatory aspects of new forms of dispute resolution
are available to those who can pay for them, they should also be
available for those who cannot pay for them. 101

(2001).
96. ROBERT J. NlEMIC, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEAL (1997); see also ROBERT J, NlEMEC, MEDIATION IN BANKRUPTCY (1998).
97. See Tennessee higher cd. case, Cleveland, and Ohio (appointment of Howard Bellman
for state-wide mediation,) etc.
98. Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey Senger, ADR and the Federal Government, 66 Mo. L. REv.
709 (2001).
99. Common issues include family law, housing issues, entitlement disputes, consumer
disputes, wage and employment disputes, and a host of other problems that involve poor people
and the state and disputes among the disempowered. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for
All-Including the Unrepresented Poor, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987 (1999); Linda Singer et al.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part 1: What ADR Processes Exist and Why
Advocates Should Become Involved, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE R. 142 (1992); Linda Singer et al.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part II: Dealing with Problems in Using ADR and
Choosing a Process, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE R. 288 (1992).
100. Proponents of social justice must be sensitive to the "siphoning off' of "smaller"
claims to secondary institutions. Richard Abel, The Contradictions ofInformal Justice, in THE
POLmCS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality, 1985 WISC. L. REv. 1359; Trina Grillo, Mediation: Process Dangers for Women,
100YALEL.J.1545(1991).
101. Tailored solutions, in some circumstance, bring better and faster "relief' and should
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There are many other examples of concrete successes with
mediation and consensus building processes to achieve creative
outcomes to complex legal and policy problems with greater party
participation.
Access and resources are as important in mediation and consensus
building processes as in the formal justice system. Participation
requires time, as well as financial resources that many people do not
have. Both Iris Y oung102 and Oscar Wilde have eloquently stated this
critique: "The trouble with socialism is that it takes too many
evenings."I03 Some suggest that consensus, consent, and quality
results might be harder to achieve in group settings where positions,
interests, and arguments might either become poiarizedIo4 or
"regress" to a compromised mean or to an inadequately tested
"groupthink"I05 (or "path dependent") solution.106 Others suggest that
there is a certain irony in suggesting that specialized experts, like
mediators or consensus building facilitators, are needed to enhance
democratic participation in decision-making and problem-solving.
Why should democracy depend on experts and especially, legal
experts?I07 These objections obviate the need for lawyers, particularly
public interest minded lawyers, to learn new and different skills from
the standard diet of case-based adversary argument and analysis.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: TRAINING THE MODERN
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYER

If there are other ways to deal with multi-party and multi-faceted
legal and policy dilemmas, through the use of facilitated negotiated

be available regardless of ability to pay.
102. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY
670 (2001).
103. BARRY DAY, OSCAR WILDE: A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (2000). The same can be said of
participatory democracy.
104. Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71
(2000).
105. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOS (2d ed. 1982). "Groupthink" is also referred to as a "path dependent" solution.
106. Perhaps groups will seek the "lowest common denominator" rather than the pareto
optimal solution.
107. No process is perfect and I think these objections, and others, are well made and
deserve more consideration than I give them here.
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processes such as mediation and consensus building, then the modem
law student and lawyer will need to learn a variety of other skills and
"intelligences"I08 to engage in this work. First, traditional legal
analysis has to be supplemented with substantive and synthetic forms
of creative thinking. 109 Lawyers must learn to solve problems by
looking beyond the precedents and boilerplates of prior cases and
prior deals. The early days of the public interest movement are
replete with examples of lawyers developing new causes of action
and new legal theories. 110 Here, I am suggesting that some creativity
with respect to process may be as important as substantive legal ideas
and will require learning how to think outside of conventional legal
boxes. Argument, trials, and legal research are all still important
aspects of a legal education. Nevertheless, a more modem legal
education should include instruction on the sociology and psychology
of group behavior. lll This will enable students to understand how
decisions are made, to understand meeting management and
facilitation,112 to be able to wisely conduct the meetings that produce
legal solutions to problems, and the constituent skills ofnegotiationl13
and mediation. 114 Beyond learning the role of the neutral, now

108. See the work of Howard Gardner in specifying a variety of human intelligences in
which logico-linguistic intelligences (the most common form of intelligences for lawyers) are
only some of the intelligences humans possess to solve problem. HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES
OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983).
109. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving
and Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARv. NEG. J. 97 (2001).
110. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (land as public trusts); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMlNJSM UNMODIFIED
(1987) (pornography as a civil wrong); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733
(1964) (government entitlements as property); Symposium, The Legacy ofGoldberg v. Kelly: A
Twenty Year Perspective,S BROOK. L. REv. 731 (1990) (procedural due process revolution).
111. Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998); Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics and Settlement, 76 TEx. L. REv. 77 (1997).
112. See, e.g., ROGER SCHWARTZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR (1994); TIM HINDLE,
MANAGING MEETINGS (1998).
113. These skills include client interviewing and counseling, questioning, information
development and fact-finding, brainstorming, as well as argumentation.
114. Mediation requires a kind of "neutrality" quite inimical to most conceptions of the
lawyer. The American Bar Association has recognized this important function of lawyers, in its
recently approved new version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Report of the
Commission on Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 (Feb. 5, 2002) (approved by the
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common in law school courses in mediation, the modem lawyer
needs to learn how to be "inside" these new processes, if not as a
traditional advocate then as a representative of creative ideas, as well
as client interests. 115
In addition, law students and lawyers need to explicitly learn how
to represent organizational and constituency interests,116 as business
students learn explicitly about entity and organizational interests and
conflicts in decision-making. Recognizing that modem legal
problems do not often divide into sides, modem lawyers need to learn
about coalitional 1l7 behavior and multi-party processes 118 and how
they differ in both theory and practice from dyadic processes. Finally,
if we take multi-culturalism seriously, both domestically and
internationally, we must avoid legal ethnocentrism that is already
threatening some international ADR processes,119 as well as public
interest work in other nations. 120 Issues of managing inter-cultural
and multi-jurisdictional disputes, transactions, treaties, and policy

A.B.A. House of Delegates). The Preamble and Rules 1.12 and 2.4 now recognize the role of
the lawyer as "third party neutral" as a "non-representational role helping parties to resolve a
dispute or plan a transactional matter." See also Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Pino, Neutrality: A
Guidefor the Organizational Ombudsperson, 13 NEG. J. 17 (1997).
115. A growing body of literature addresses this need for different teaching topics and
modalities. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?, 6 HARv.
NEG. J. 189 (2001); Jean Stemlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation, 14 OHIO
ST. J. DISP. REsOL. 269 (1999).
116. These include managing a group client process, which is different from individual
clients.
117. For some important treatments of these topics for legal audiences, see Gary
Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. DISP. REs. 243 (1994);
ROBERT MNoOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING (2000). See also HOWARD RAiFFA, LECTURES ON
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiating with Lawyers, Men and
Things, 17 NEG. J. 257 (2001).
118. A few scholars in the ADR field have begun teaching 'advanced" negotiation courses
in multi-party dispute resolution-Melanie Greenberg and I at Georgetown, Robert Mnookin
and Lawrence Susskind at Harvard, and Maude Prevere at Stanford-which draw on these
subjects and others.
119. Many critics charge, for example, that international commercial arbitration is
becoming ever more "americanized" as American forms of discovery and litigation tactics
begin to swamp older European forms of practice and civil law understandings of the lex
mercatoria. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTiON OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1996).
120. See, e.g., Stephen EHmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE
LAWYERING (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE
STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2001).
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agendas will require development of rigorous and sensitive ways to
explore legal problem solving beyond the assumptions of American
constitutionalism, lawmaking, and litigation processes.
In the wake of September 11, I have been doing my most
challenging, difficult, and exciting teaching and practice. How can
we attempt to forge justice and peace in a world in which there are
many conflicting world views?121 Since I have come to believe, with
the painfulness of our recent tragedies and the domestic aftermaths,
that agreement as to the substantive good is unlikely, we should turn
a lot of our attention to the possibility of designing some processes
that will work to cross those divides. If "the skillful management of
conflicts is among the highest of human skills,,,l22 as Stuart
Hampshire suggests it is, it is in the public interest to pursue more
varied methods for resolving conflicts and seeking justice. It is clear
that war and its legal equivalent of litigation are necessary in some
circumstances. Hopefully, our legal institutions, like all human
institutions, will evolve and change to meet the changing demands of
an ever-diversifying world of different values, save perhaps one: a
human universal to survive and flourish.
121. For a domestic exploration of the difficulty of negotiating across radically different
world views, see JOYCE DOHERTY, LESSONS FROM WACO (2001). For another depressing
international perspective, see MICHAEL IGNATlEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993).
122. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1.
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